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PHILLIPS V. AWH CORPORATION: ASKING QUESTIONS,
BUT REFUSING TO HEAR THE ANSWER - A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RECENT DECISION REGARDING
THE USE OF DICTIONARIES AND THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1790, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1790.1 Although
Congress passed the act with great reservation by one of its drafters,
Thomas Jefferson, it would later spark a technology boom in the United
States.2 If Thomas Jefferson were alive today, he would not be
"embarrassed" at the granting of the monopoly for an invention, but at
the embarrassment that after 200 hundred years there are basic questions
about the patent system that have not been answered.3 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently requested that interested parties
assist the court in answering, among other questions, what role
dictionaries should play in claim construction and what deference, if
any, should the Federal Circuit give to a lower court's claim
construction.4 But when given those answers, the Federal Circuit chose
only to deal with the "small" issue of the use of dictionaries and ignore
the all important question of what deference to give to lower courts'
decisions.5 Hoping to take the battle to the Supreme Court, AWH
petitioned the Supreme Court to finally answer the question that patent
attorneys have been waiting to hear.
6
1. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
2. Graham et al. v. John Deere Co. of Kansas, 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (stating that Jefferson
feared that the creation of a patent system would also create the embarrassment of a monopoly).
3. See infra notes 80-99 and the accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 115-134 and the accompanying text.
5. Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1332 (2006) ("After consideration of the matter, we have decided not to address that issue at this
time. We therefore leave undisturbed our prior en banc decision in Cybor.").
6. Mark W. Fischer, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/01/phillips v awh .html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2006). The question presented in the petition is "[w]hether the Federal Circuit
1
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This note begins in Section II by summarizing the history of the
patent system and introducing two of the main issues raised in Phillips v.
A WH Corp.7 Section III gives the history of Phillips v. A WH Corp. and
how it has progressed through the legal system.8 Section IV analyzes
the two main issues raised in Phillips and the impact of the decision.9
Finally, Section V concludes with closing remarks for the future of
patent law in the United States.'o
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Patent System Generally
The Constitution of the United States of America invests in
Congress the power to establish a national patent system.11 Using this
granted power, Congress enacted the Act of 1790 that created a national
patent system.12 Later, Congress amended this act in 1793 and created
is correct in holding that all aspects of a district court's patent claim construction may be reviewed
de novo on appeal." Id. at i. The main points of AWH Corps.' Petition are:
A. The Federal Circuit's Insistence That Claim Construction Does Not Include Any
Factual Issues Conflicts With This Court's Decision In Markman And Graham.
B. The Federal Circuit's Applications of De Novo Review To The Factual Findings
Underlying Claim Construction Conflicts With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
And This Court's Decisions Regarding Appellate Review Of Mixed Questions Of Law
And Fact
C. The Issue Of The Proper Standard Of Deference On Appeal Is Ripe For Review By
This Court
D. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Resolving The Issue
Id. at iii - iv. In opposition to AWH's petition, Phillips has filed a reply that states 1) the case is not
presented in the correct posture for review because the district court has already declined to rule on
the issue, the issue is not ripe for discussion and the facts of the case should not be reviewed, 2) that
even if the case were in the correct posture for the appeal, the district court is following the
guidance of the Supreme Court, there is no conflict with F. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and claim construction
is purely question of law. F. David LaRiviere, Opposition to Petition filed by AWH Corporation,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/01/phillipsv awh_ .html (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). On
February 21, 2006 the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari to consider the
questions raised in Phillips. AWH Corp. v. Phillips, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006) (certiorari denied).
7. See infra notes 11-99 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 100-134 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 135-200 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("The Congress shall have the Power To... promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
12. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. The act authorized patents for "any useful
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used," provided a designated group of executive officers (the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, and the Attorney General) determined that the invention was "sufficiently useful and
[1:65
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the foundation for the patent system as it exists today.' 3 Congress later
empowered the Commissioner of Patents to handle the large number of
submitted patents.1 4 On April 2, 1982, in an attempt to create uniformity
in the patent system, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the
Federal Courts Improvements Acts of 1982.15
Congress has created several defenses that an alleged infringer can
assert against the owner of a granted patent. 6  Among the list of
defenses, an alleged infringer can show that the patented matter lacks
novelty or that the invention was "insufficiently disclosed in the
inventor's specification."1 7  The Patent and Trademark Office subjects
important." DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §2.
13. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 2. The Act of 1793 authorized patents for "any useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement [thereon], not
known or used before the application... " Id. As stated by Donald Chisum, "[tlhe 1790 and 1793
patent statutes, and court decisions interpreting them, introduced fundamental concepts that remain
features of United States patent law." Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. §131(2005) ("It was duty of Commissioner [now Director of U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office] to decide whether invention was new and whether it was proper subject of
patent."). Congress empowered the Commissioner to act free of the courts when it stated that "
[the] Commissioner [now Director of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office], not the courts, has duty of
promulgating rules and procedures for examination of patent applications." Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2005). The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was not without much controversy. See MARTIN J ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER, JOHN R.
THOMAS & HAROLD C. WEGNER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 15-16 (2nd ed. 2003).
Several lawmakers were concerned that the creation of a specialized court "might foster legal
doctrines out of the mainstream of American jurisprudence or might fall captive to a narrow
segment of the bar." Id. at 16. To address this issue, the final version of the act provided
jurisdiction for the court in "more than ten categories of appeals from patents to customs to taxes to
government contracts and more." Id. (commenting on the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1295). Some
authors see the creation of the Federal Circuit as
the first major structural change in the federal appellate system since creation of the
regional circuits in 1891. The confusion in patent law reached such proportions in the
late 1960s and 1970s that only a structural change of this magnitude could correct the
problem. Since its creation, the Federal Circuit has sought to bring uniformity and
predictability to patent law.
Id.
16. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 2. Because of the "embarrassment of an exclusive patent"
the courts fashioned rules that limit the duration of a patent's life and allow for those who believe
the patent has been unjustly granted to challenge the patent. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
9 (1966). As a proponent of the patent system, Jefferson feared that patents would be granted for
"small details, obvious improvements or frivolous devices." Id. The defenses granted to alleged
infringers allows the public to ensure that patents that are issued provide some benefit to the public.
Id.
17. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 2. The defenses provided are:
[T]he specification, filed by the plaintiff, does not contain the whole truth relative to his
discovery, or ... contains more than is necessary to produce the described effect, which
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each patent application to a thorough examination by an Examiner.'" In
the event that a patent applicant disagrees with the finding of the
Examiner, the applicant can appeal the decision to the Commissioner or
to the Board of Patent Appeals. 19 If the applicant is still not satisfied
with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals, the applicant can
further appeal to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [Federal Circuit].2 °
One area of consistent conflict is over the construction of the
meaning of claims in a patent.2' As a relatively new area of law, claim
[T]he thing, thus secured by patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee, but
had been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed
discovery of the patentee, or that he had surreptitiously obtained a patent for the
discovery of another person.
18. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 1. As stated by Donald Chisum:
The PTO assigns each application to an examiner with technical training in the pertinent
technology who conducts a search of the prior art and determines whether the applicant's
invention complies with the legal requirements of patentability: novelty, utility,
nonobviousness, enabling disclosure, and clear claiming. If the examiner reaches a
favorable decision, he or she allows the claims.
CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 1.
19. See IRA H. DONNER, I PATENT PROSECUTION, LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 208-09
(4th ed. 2005). The Applicant may appeal the decision to either the Commissioner or to the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences depending on the objection and rejection. Id at 209. The
Board has stated:
[T]hat part of the examiner's "objection" which centers on description, enablement and
best mode concerns the correspondence of the specification to the statutory requirements
set fourth in 35 U.S.S. Section 112 and is within the jurisdiction of this Board. However,
that part of the "objection" which relates to the examiner's desire for information
concerning (a) an explanation of the "gist" of the invention, [and] (b)... the goals
sought to be achieved by the inventors, relates solely to the ease and accuracy of the
examination process and the ability of the examiner to obtain sufficient information
therefrom to effectively examine the application. It concerns either the rules of practice
or established customs and practices. It is outside the jurisdiction of this Board.
Id. (quoting from Ex parte C, 27 USPQ2d 1492, 1494 (B.P.A.I. 1993)) The Patent Office is
obligated to follow the decisions of the Federal Circuit or the Federal Circuit's' predecessor, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Id. For a discussion on the appeal process within the Patent
Office, see DONNER, supra note 19, at 208-17.
20. Id. at 217 (stating the rule as described in Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, 68 Fed. Reg. 66, 648 (Nov. 26, 2003)). For a discussion on the appeal
process with the Federal Circuit, see DONNER, supra note 19, at 217-37.
21. James W. Brady, Jr. and Gary M. Hoffman, Patent Claim Construction as Clarified by the
Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH Corp., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Sept. 2005, at 32
(stating that the decision in Phillips v. A WH Corp. leaves important questions unanswered). See
also, Kimberly A. Moore, Markman, Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (stating that the reversal rate, "rate at which the Federal
Circuit determined the claim construction was wrong," is at 34.5% since Markman was decided).
Claims are the most important part of the patent because the claims define the metes and bounds of
the invention. ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 525. Claims must "precisely define entitlements for
worldwide markets and industries." Id. Patent claims are have three major parts, the preamble, the
4
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construction is still in its formative years.22 One area of patent law that
is still in development is claim construction with regards to dictionaries,
and what deference, if any, the Federal Circuit should give to the
decisions of lower courts. 3
B. Dictionary definitions and claim construction
To determine if a patent has been infringed, judges developed a
two-step process.24 The judge will first look at the claim and determine
a construction of its meaning.25 The judge will then compare the
construction of the claim to the accused product.26  The first step .in this
two-step process often uses both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.27
transition phrase, and the body. Id. at 533. The preamble is used to notify others of the broad area
of technology to which the invention relates. Id. at 534. The transition phrase defines whether the
claims is "open" or "closed." Id. at 541. An open claim is limited to "structures containing at least
the recited elements" while closed claims are limited to the elements listed in the claims. Id. The
body of the patent claim "recites the elements of the invention, as well as their interaction with each
other either structurally or functionally." Id. at 542.
22. See generally, ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 16 (stating that the field of patent law was in a
state of confusion in the late 1960s and 1970s.) Adelman's book performs a case by case analysis
of patent laws and decisions from the various courts in the history of patent law to determine how
uniform and predictable this field of law is. Id. See also, Brady, supra note 21, at 33 (stating that
the issue of deference to other courts still needs to be address in patent law); Moore, supra note 21,
at 246-7 (stating that claim construction is still in its adolescence, "eight years from the Supreme
Court's Markman and ten years from the Federal Circuit's Markman").
23. See generally, Brady, supra note 21, at 32-33 (stating that the use of dictionaries as
extrinsic or intrinsic evidence has been in flux since the decision of the Federal Circuit in Texas
Digital Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (2002), Nystrom v. TREX Co., 374 F.3d 1105 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) withdrawn and substituted 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and Inverness Med Switz.
GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). which place more weight on the
dictionary than on the specification). Judges on the Federal Circuit, such as Judge Mayer, have
consistently dissented from the Federal Circuit's holding that claim construction is a question of law
and not fact. See e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
24. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 18.03. In one decision the court stated:
This court's precedent provides a road map for district courts in assessing whether
accused devices infringe patent claims. In short, an assessment of whether an accused
device infringes claims of a patent necessarily involves both an identification and
interpretation of the asserted claims, and a comparison of the properly interpreted claim
limitations to the elements of the accused device. The first step in any such analysis is to
construe the claims at issue, which is a matter of law for the court, Once the court has
construed the claim limitations, the second step in its analysis is to apply the claims to
the accused device.
Id. (quoting Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002))
25. Id. at § 18.03 n. 1. Each claim in a patent is considered individually to determine if
infringement has occurred. Id. If one claim of a patent is infringed, the entire patent is deemed to
have been infringed. Id.
26. Id. at §18.03 n. 2. See also, Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
27. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d at 979-980. The court in Markman stated the
20071
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Courts are often divided on whether certain evidence is intrinsic or
28extrinsic. Due to the complexity of modem technology, courts often
resort to the use of dictionaries to define certain terms.29 Once a court
allows the introduction of a dictionary as evidence of the meaning of a
term, the court must also determine which dictionary to use because both
general dictionaries and technical dictionaries exist. 30 The decision of
which dictionary to use is often based on the degree of technical
information involved in the disputed patent.31
Claim construction becomes an important issue when lower courts
interpret the patent claims to have one construction and the Federal
Circuit determines that the claims have a different construction. 32 The
meaning of a claim is determined by looking at the claims, specification and prosecution history.
Id. at 979 (quoting from Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
The court goes on to state that "[i]n construing the claims in this case, all these sources, as well as
extrinsic evidence in the form of Westview's sales literature, were included in the record of the trial
court proceedings." Id. at 979.
28. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 18.03. Chisum states that:
Other decisions have questioned whether it is accurate to characterize dictionaries,
treatises, and encyclopedia as extrinsic, given the accepted notion that courts may always
consult them and given that such published texts, unlike other forms of extrinsic
evidence, such as expert testimony, are available to the public as of the date the patent is
granted.
Id. at § 18.03.
29. Id. at § 18.03. The court in Texas Digital stated that:
(1) [d]ictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, publicly available at the time the patent is
issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information on the
established meanings that would have been attributed to the terms of the claims by those
of skill in the art.;
(2)[a]s resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the understanding
of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for both trial and appellate judges to
consult these materials at any stage of a litigation, regardless of whether they have been
offered by a party in evidence or not"; and
(3) categorizing them as 'extrinsic evidence' or even a 'special form of extrinsic
evidence' is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.
Id. at 18.03 (quoting from Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03
(2002)).
30. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204-05.
31. Id. at 1205. The court stated:
By examining relevant dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises to ascertain possible
meanings that would have been attributed to the words of the claims by those skilled in
the art, and by further utilizing the intrinsic record to select from those possible
meanings the one or ones most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor, the
full breadth of the limitations intended by the inventor will be more accurately
determined and the improper importation of unintended limitations from the written
description into the claims will be more easily avoided.
Id.
32. See, e.g., Erik Paul Belt, Taking The Poetry Out of Litigation The Federal Circuit Wants
There To Be Less Wiggle-Room For Words In Patent Cases, IP LAW AND BUSINESS, December 6,
2003 (discussing the Federal Circuit reversing the trial court's determination of the meaning of "on"
[ 1:65
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Federal Circuit has consistently held that claim construction is question
of law, not a question of fact, and therefore the Federal Circuit does not
have to give deference to the construction of the lower court.33
However, this lack of deference often results in needless rehearing of
previously submitted evidence and high litigation costs. 34  The Federal
Circuit developed the rules of claim construction review and the use of
dictionaries in claim construction in several major cases.35
C. Prior Federal Court Cases
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.3 6
The use of dictionaries in claim construction has occurred over a
long line of cases.37 One of the leading cases in claim construction is
Federal Circuit's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
38
The case concerned a patent that disclosed an apparatus and method for
tracking articles in a dry cleaning business. 39 The Markman jury ruled
in a patent claim in Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
33. See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Moore supra note 21, at 233.
35. See infra notes 36-99 and accompanying text.
36. Markman, 52 F.3d at 967
37. Compare Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that extrinsic evidence "in general, and expert testimony in particular, may be used only to help the
court come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict the
claim language") with Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (holding that dictionaries should be consulted first to determine "possible meanings that
would have been attributed to the words of the claims by those skilled in the art" and then looking at
the specification to see if the specification is consistent with the dictionary definition) and Brady,
supra note 21, at 32 (stating that a line of cases beginning with Texas Digital and continuing
through Nystrom v. TREX Co., 374 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH
v. Warner Lambert Co. 309 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) agree that dictionaries should be given more
weight in claim construction when determining the meaning of words in claims).
38. Markman, 52 F.3d at 967.
39. Markman, 52 F.3d at 972-73. The relevant claims in United States Reissue Patent No.
33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987) state:
I. The inventory control and reporting system, comprising:
a data input device for manual operation by an attendant, the input device having switch
means operable to encode information relating to sequential transactions, each of the
transactions having articles associated therewith, said information including transaction
identity and descriptions of each of said articles associated with the transactions;
a data processor including memory operable to record said information and means to
maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to associate sequential
transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate at least one report of said
2007]
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that the Markman design was infringed by Westview. 40 The district
court, however, reversed the opinion of the jury and construed the claims
so that there was no infringement by Westview.4' Markman appealed,
claiming that the district court incorrectly reviewed the jury's decision
concerning the facts of the case and in turn substituted the district court's
decision for the jury's. 42 Markman also claimed that the district court
incorrectly construed the meaning of the word "inventory. ''43 The
total and said transactions, the unique sequential indicia and the descriptions of articles
in the sequential transactions being reconcilable against one another;
a dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to generate a written
record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the written record including
optically-detectable bar codes having a series of contrasting spaced bands, the bar codes
being printed only in coincidence with each said transaction and at least part of the
written record bearing a portion to be attached to said articles; and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to detect said
bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station,whereby said system can detect
and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.
'054 Patent.
In dependent claim 10, Markman specifies that in the invention of claim 1, the input device is an
alpha-numeric keyboard wherein single keys may be used to enter attributes of items being entered.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 972.
40. Id. at 973. Westview is the owner of specialty electronic equipment that it uses in one of
its dry cleaning shops. Id. at 972. The accused infringing device consists of a DATAMARK and a
DATASCAN that is used to identify additional or missing invoices. Id. The DATAMARK only
retains in its memory the invoice number, date, and cash total. Id. The DATASCAN is this carried
about the store to read the inventory on hand and compare it to the list stored by the DATAMARK.
Id. at 973. The jury was instructed by the court to construct the meaning of the claims of the '054
Patent by considering the specification, drawings, file history and other relevant documents. Id. at
973. The jury was then instructed to determine how the terms of the claim would be understood by
those with ordinary skill in the art. Id. Finally, the jury was to compare the claims to the alleged
infringing devices to determine if infringement occurred. Id. The jury found that the Westview
infringed claims I and 10 of the '054 Patent.
41. Id. at 973. The district court reasoned that because claim construction was a matter of
law, it was entitled to review the finding of the jury. Id. at 973. The court held that "inventory" was
"'articles of clothing' and not simply transaction totals or dollars." Id. at 973. The court also found
that "Westview's device does not have the 'means to maintain inventory total' required by claim 1,
and cannot 'detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as spurious deletions
therefrom,' and directed a verdict of noninfringement of claims 1 and 10." Id. at 973.
42. Markmnan, 52 F.3d at 973-4. Markman argued that the court had improperly replaced the
finding of the jury with its own findings. Id. at 974. Markman argued that claim construction was
an issue of fact that a jury is to decide based on the evidence presented. Id. at 973. As such, the
judge is not permitted to replace his decision with that of the jury. Id. The claims at issue,
according to Markman, were properly construed by a competent jury, as directed by the judge. Id.
At trial, the jury was tasked by the judge to aid in the determination of infringement by construing
the claims of the patent in issue. Id. at 974. Markman stated that once this task was given to the
jury, it could not be taken back, or overruled by the judge. Id.
43. Id. at 974. The jury was presented with all the facts of the case, the patent, the
prosecution history, experts and documents, to arrive a competent decision. Id. Aside for the issue
8
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Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that
the claim construction is a question of law and the district court's review
of the jury's decision was proper.44
On review of the lower court's decisions, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether claim construction is a question of law
for the judge to decide or a question of fact for the jury to decide.45 The
Supreme Court started by considering the history of patent law to
determine if the question has historically been one of law or fact.46
However, the Supreme Court never ruled on the issue of the importance
of extrinsic evidence, thus leaving the district courts to develop their
own interpretation of its importance.47
of who determines the meaning of the word "inventory" Markman claims that "based on all the
evidence presented at trial, the term 'inventory' as used in claim I means 'article of clothing' or
'dollars' or 'cash' or 'invoices,' and is not necessarily limited to a construction that always includes
'articles of clothing' " Id.
44. Id. at 970. The opinion of the court, stated by Chief Judge Archer stated that "in this case
the district court properly discharged its obligation to delineate the scope of the claim on motion for
judgment as a matter of law when the jury had rendered a verdict that was incompatible with a
proper claim construction." Id.
45. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. The decision of the Supreme Court remains in controversy.
See e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330-5 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Supreme Court, in
affirming Markman, never stated that claim construction is purely a question of law). Judge Mayer
has taken that position that the Supreme Court only stated that as a "policy matter" judges should
determine the meaning of claims. Id. at 1330. Judge Mayer argues that the Supreme Court has not
accepted the Federal Circuit's blanket formulation that claim construction is a question of law. See
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d. 1448, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, C.J.,
dissenting).
46. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. The Supreme Court has traditionally used a three part test to
determine whether actions are questions of law or questions of equity. Joan E. Schaffner, The
Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth And The Supreme Court
Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 225, 226 (Spring 2002). The first step is to determine if the
action was tried at law or analogous to an action that was tried at law. Id. If the action is one tried
at law, the Court will determine "whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791." Id. (quoting Markman, 517
U.S. 370, 376 (1996)). If the action meets this criteria, then the jury must decide the action. Id.
Finally, the Court will determine the deference to be given to the jury's decision by the trial judge
and the appellate courts. Id. at 227-228. The Supreme Court in Markman determined that there is a
right to a jury trial for infringement actions. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. However, when dealing
with claim construction the "Court found no persuasive authority indicating more than a possibility
that juries historically interpreted terms of art in a specification. Consequently, the jury guarantee
of the Seventh Amendment did not encompass the jury's construction of the claim." Schaffner,
supra, at 244. Ultimately, the Court determined that in an effort to achieve conformity in patent
claim construction, the judge would be best at performing the claim construction. Id. at 244.
47. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 18.03. See e.g., Astraveneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co, Inc.,
384 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that the District Court is relying on "recent case law,
which is unfortunately complex and inconsistent); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 861-62 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (admitting that there are two opinions in the district courts
where one opinion is that the "intrinsic record is the primary source for determining claim meaning"
and a second opinion that follows Texas Digital by "emphasiz[ing] technical and general-usage
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2. Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.4 8
Vitronics involved a suit between Vitronics and Conceptronic for
the violation of two U.S. patents.49  A jury found that the '301 patent
was not infringed but both parties disputed the meaning of the term
"solder flow temperature" in the '502 patent. 50 After hearing all the
evidence, the district court found for Conceptronic as a matter of law.
5 1
dictionaries in determining the ordinary meaning").
48. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
49. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578-79. The invention in question dealt with a process for
soldering of components onto a circuit board. Id. at 1579. The process entailed placing the
components on the solder board using a paste. Id. The boards were then sent through a multizone
oven to be soldered to the board. Id. It was critical to the process that the temperature in the oven
be below the critical temperature of the components being placed onto the solder board, but high
enough to allow the paste to flow and create a solder joint. Id. Vitronics sued Conceptronic for
violation of U.S. Patent Nos. 4,654,502 and 4,833,301. Id. The claim in issue of U.S. Patent No.
4,654,502 states:
1. A method for reflow soldering of surface mounted devices to a printed circuit board
comprising:
moving a printed circuit board having solder and devices disposed on a surface thereof
through a first zone and in close proximity to a first emitting surface of at least one
nonfocused infrared panel emitter, said first emitting surface being at a first panel
temperature;
moving said board through a second zone and in close proximity to a second emitting
surface of at least one nonfocused infrared panel emitter, said second emitting surface
being at a second panel temperature lower than said first panel temperature; and
moving said board through a third zone and in close proximity to a third emitting surface
of at least one nonfocused infrared panel emitter, said third emitting surface being at a
third panel temperature higher than said second panel temperature, said third emitting
surface heating said board and said solder to a solder reflow temperature for a period of
time sufficient to cause said solder to reflow and solder said devices to said board while
maintaining the temperature of said devices below said solder reflow temperature.
U.S. Patent No. 4,654,502.
50. Id. at 1579-80. Vitronic's appeal is centered around their requested jury instruction. Id. at
1579. Vitronics claims that the proper jury instruction should have stated that the proper definition
of solder reflow temperature is "the temperature reached by the solder during the period it is
reflowing during the final stages of the soldering process, sometimes referred to as the 'peak solder
reflow temperature."' Id. Vitronics asserted that the definition does not mean the "liquidus
temperature," the temperature at which the solder first begins to melt. Id. at 1580. As a result, if this
definition is applied by the court, the '502 patent has been infringed as a matter of law. Id. at 1580.
Conceptronic, however, claims that solder reflow temperature means "peak reflow temperature, i.e.,
a temperature approximately 20 degrees C above the liquidus temperature, at which the solder is
completely melted and moves freely." Id. If this definition is used, the '502 patent has not been
infringed by Conceptronic. Id.
51. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1580. The district court delayed ruling on the meaning of the
disputed term until the close of all testimony. Id. The court relied on the patent specification,
expert testimony, information for Vitronics and its employees and technical references provide
10
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On review, the Federal Circuit, while relying significantly on the
wording of the claims and specification, held that the "solder flow
temperature" limitation should have been interpreted in favor of
Vitronics12 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the meaning of terms in a
claim are to be construed by giving weight to intrinsic evidence first.
53
Only when there is a significant conflict, will extrinsic evidence be used
to determine the meaning of terms.54 As a result of the holding in
Vitronics, courts subsequently gave more weight to intrinsic evidence
over extrinsic evidence.55
3. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.56
The Texas Digital case, however, signaled a change in the direction
of several circuit courts in their handling of intrinsic versus extrinsic
evidence.57 In Texas Digital, the plaintiff, Texas Digital Systems, Inc.,
brought an action against Telegenix, Inc. for patent infringement.58
during trial and through briefs filed by both parties. Id. Vitronics asserted during the trial that,
although the meaning of solder reflow temperature was ambiguous, there was still adequate
explanation of the term in the specification for a court to use in determining the meaning of the
term. Id. However, Conceptronic based most of its case on expert testimony and documents from
Vitronics that use a definition similar to the one asserted by Conceptronic. Id. In effect, the
construction of the claim hinged on what weight to give the specification versus extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 1585.
52. Id. at 1587. The Federal Circuit stated that the district court did not provide the reasoning
behind its interpretation of the claim term, thus the Federal Circuit reviewed the evidence in total.
Id. at 1585.
53. Id. at 1584. The Federal Circuit determined that the district court gave too much weight
to the extrinsic evidence in allowing it to overrule the weight of the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1584.
54. Id. at 1584. The Federal Circuit stated that extrinsic evidence, in particular expert
testimony, can only be relied on if "the patent documents, taken as a whole, are insufficient to
enable the court to construe disputed claim terms." Id. at 1585. However, the Federal Circuit did
admit that dictionaries and prior art documents are not in the same class of extrinsic evidence as
expert testimony, thus they are more objective and reliable guides. Id. The Federal Circuit
reasoned that "these sources are accessible to the public in advance of litigation." Id. For the
Federal Circuit opinion on the weight of opinion testimony, refer to Markman, 52 F.3d at 983
("First, the testimony of Markman and his patent attorney on the proper construction of the claims is
entitled to no deference ... This testimony about construction, however, amounts to no more than
legal opinion - it is precisely the process of construction that the court must undertake.").
55. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
56. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
57. Brady, supra note 21, at 32 (stating that the opinion in Phillips "provided meaningful
points and clarified concepts where previous Federal Circuit decisions were inconsistent"). Brady
discusses how the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that its prior decisions needed "clarification"
and how "previous Federal Circuit opinions placed too much emphasis on dictionary definitions of
claim terms, and too little emphasis on the patent's specification." Id.
58. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. 308 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The
plaintiff claims that the defendant has infringed four patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 4,845,481, 4,965,561,
4,734,619 and 4,804,490. Id. at 1197.
20071
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Texas Digital owned patents that disclosed how to control the color of
pixels in a light emitting diode ("LED") display.5 9 The dispute between
the parties centered on the meaning of the terms in the patent's claims
whose meaning had be constructed by the district court.60 Based on the
district court's claim construction, the jury in the original suit found in
favor of Texas Digital and the trial court affirmed this finding.61
Telegenix appealed the judgment of the district court, alleging that the
court did not correctly interpret several phrases in the patents owned by
Texas Digital.62
In its decision, the Federal Circuit found that several of the claim
limitations were correctly interpreted, while others were not correctly
interpreted, and thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 3
In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on the
definitions of several of the terms as found in the dictionary. In one
59. Id. As stated by the court, "[e]ach pixel includes at least two elements corresponding to
different primary colors, e.g., one red element and one green element. Light signals from the two
elements may be blended to produce a composite light signal of variable color." Id. at 1197-98.
One representative claim from the '481 patent states:
A method for controlling a color of a variable color display device which comprises a
plurality of display areas arranged in a pattern for selectively exhibiting a plurality of
display areas arranged in a pattern for selectively exhibiting a plurality of display units,
each said display area including a plurality of light sources for emitting upon activation
light signals of respectively different primary colors and means for combining said light
signals to obtain a composite light signal of a composite color, by exhibiting a selected
display unit by repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating the light sources in
selected display areas for brief time intervals to cause the light sources to emit light
signals of said primary colors, and by selectively controlling the durations of the time
intervals of activation of the light sources in the selected display areas to control the
portions of the primary color light signals emitted therefrom, to thereby control the color
of the exhibited display unit.
60. Id. at 1205-15. The jury was instructed as to the district court's interpretation of the terms
"repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating," "selectively controlling the durations of the
time intervals of activation," "color control means," "display areas" and "background area,"
"display areas arranged in a pattern," "means for selectively activating said display light sources,"
"converter means," "first means" and "second means," and "control means for selectively coupling
said light sources" Id.
61. Id. at 1201. The court awarded significant damages to Texas Digital and also
permanently enjoined Telegenix from "making, using, selling, or offering to sell its Colorgraphix
color display devices." Id. at 1201. The district court also found that each of the asserted claims
were not invalid. Id.
62. Texas Digital Systems, 308 F.3d at 1201. Telegenix appealed the Markman order, the jury
instruction, the refusal of the district court to consider several pieces of evidence offered by
Telegenix, the admittance of certain evidence by Texas Digital and the reliance of the court on Wine
Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway Equipment Co., 297 U.S. 387 (1936). Id.
63. Id. at 1220.
64. Id. at 1202-03. The court, in discussing the use of dictionaries in claim interpretation
stated dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, are "unbiased reflections of common understanding
not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the
12
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instance, the court relied on the Modem Dictionary of Electronics to
determine the meaning of a term.65 Once the meaning of the term in the
dictionary was found, the court then compared that meaning to the
specification to verify that the specification did not state a definition for
the term that was counter to the definition in the dictionary. 66  If no
conflict was found, the court applied the dictionary definition in its
interpretation of the claims in the patent.67
4. Inverness Medical Switzerland v. Warner Lambert Company
68
Inverness continued the trend that began in Texas Digital.69  In
Inverness, the plaintiff Inverness Medical, was the assignee of U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,622,871, 5,602,040, and 5,656,503. 70  The patents
disclosed a pregnancy testing device that utilizes a woman's urine to
grant of the patent, nor colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation." Id. at
1203. The court then went on to state that the intrinsic evidence is then compared to the ordinary
meaning of the word. Id. at 1204.
65. Id. at 1206 (using Modem Dictionary of Electronics to construe the meaning of the term
"activating").
66. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d. at 1203. One claim that was in issue hinged on the meaning of
the phrase "repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating." Id. at 1205. The Federal Circuit
began its claim construction by first looking to the relevant technical dictionary, the Modem
Dictionary of Electronics 20 (6th ed. 1984). Id. at 1206. The Federal Circuit, then looked to the
specification to see if this definition was rebutted, and finding that it was not, the definition from the
dictionary was controlling. Id. In another instance, the Federal Circuit construed the meaning of
the term "display areas" and "background area." Id. at 1209. The Federal Circuit states the method
of claim construction is to start by first looking for the "ordinary meaning of 'display area,' as
reflected in these dictionary definitions." Id. Then the judge is to look at the specification to see it
is consistent with the dictionary definition. Id.
67. Id. at 1205-16. The Federal Circuit constructed a total of nine phrases in the disputed
patents. Id. Commentors have attacked the ruling in Texas Digital as "increas[ing] uncertainty in
patent litigation because litigants could never tell in advance what dictionary a judge might use to
interpret the patent." Steve Seidenberg, Federal Circuit Clears Up Patent-Interpretation Rules,
Phillips Forces Trial Courts to Construe Patents Narrowly, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, October
2005, at 28. The change also "ended up creating patent rights beyond the scope of the claims." Id.
at 28 (quoting David Long, a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Howrey). Another
commentor stated that "Texas Digital created uncertainty in another way, too. Patent litigants could
never be sure whether the court hearing their dispute would adhere to Texas Digital. About one-
third of courts followed the ruling, while the rest used the traditional method of patent
interpretation." Id. at 28 (quoting R. Polk Wagner, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School).
68. 309 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
69. Brady, supra note 21, at 32. Brady discusses how a line of cases, beginning with Texas
Digital and including Inverness, included the dictionary in claim construction. Id. See also,
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-21 (discussing the Texas line of cases that place more weight on the
dictionary and only looks to the specification if it "contains a sufficiently specific alternative
definition or disavowal").
70. Inverness, 309 F.3d at 1374.
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71determine if she is pregnant or not. Inverness claimed that Warner
Lambert Company (also known as Pfizer, Inc.) was infringing each of
the patents owned by Inverness. 72  The issue of infringement centered
around the meaning of the phrases "on said test strip," "onto a portion of
said test strip," and "mobility... is facilitated., 73  The district court
construed each of these phrases to the benefit of Pfizer and entered a
final judgment of non-infringement.74 Inverness, filed an appeal of the
district court's ruling raising two issues of improper claim
construction.75
71. Id. at 1375-76.
72. Id. at 1376.
73. Id. at 1377. The disputed language is contained in each patent and is represented by claim
I of the '871 patent which states:
An analytical test device for detecting an analyte suspected of being present in a liquid
biological sample, said device comprising:
a) a hollow casing having a liquid biological sample application aperture and means
permitting observation of a test result;
b) a test strip comprising a dry porous carrier contained within said hollow casing, said
carrier communicating directly or indirectly with the exterior of said hollow casing
through said liquid biological sample application aperture to receive applied liquid
biological sample, said carrier having a test result zone observable via said means
permitting observation, said test strip, in the dry unused state, containing a labelled
reagent capable of specifically binding with said analyte to form a first complex of said
labelled reagent and said analyte, said label being a particulate direct label, wherein said
labelled reagent is dry on said test strip prior to use and is released into mobile form by
said applied liquid biological sample, wherein mobility of said labelled reagent within
said test strip is facilitated by at least one of 1) coating at least a portion of said test strip
upstream from said test result zone with, or 2) drying said labelled reagent onto a portion
of said test strip upstream from said test result zone in the presence of, a material
comprising a sugar, in an amount effective to reduce interaction between said test strip
and said labelled reagent;
said carrier containing in said test result zone a means for binding said first complex,
said means for binding comprising specific binding means and being immobilized in said
test result zone;
migration of said applied liquid biological sample through said dry porous carrier
conveying by capillarity said first complex to said test result zone of said dry porous
carrier whereat said binding means binds said first complex thereby to form a second
complex;
said second complex being observable via said means permitting observation, thereby to
indicate the presence of said analyte in said liquid biological sample.
Id. at 1376-77.
74. Id. at 1379. The district court allowed both parties to present their evidence to the jury but
at the conclusion of closing testimony ruled in favor of Conceptronic. Id.
75. Id. at 1377. The first issue of claim construction was regarding the phrase "mobility of
14
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The Federal Circuit reviewed the construction of the phrases in
question and held that the construction of the District Court was
incorrect and thus vacated and remanded the case back for further
proceedings.76 The Federal Circuit reviewed each of the disputed claim
phrases by first relying on the dictionary meaning of the critical terms in
each phrase to determine the phrases' "ordinary meaning[s]." 7  Once the
ordinary meaning of each phrase was determined, the court considered
the specification, claim language and prosecution history to determine if
the applicant had intended another meaning besides the ordinary
meaning.78  Having found that the dictionary meaning was not
contradicted, the court held that the district court incorrectly constructed
the meaning of"on" and "onto., 7
9
D. Claim Interpretation - Question offact or law?
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court stated in Markman v
Westview Instruments that claim interpretation contains questions and
law and that the judge is in a better position than the jury to construe
these terms, much debate still remains over whether this rule should still
be followed.80 In other areas of law, issues that deal with determinations
of facts are determined by the jury.8' Only when a question concerning
said labeled reagent within said test strip is facilitated by... a material comprising a sugar." Id.
The Federal Court adopted the same interpretation of the phrase as it had in Inverness Medical
Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Id. The
second issue appealed the district court's construing of the phrase "said labelled reagent is dry on
said test strip" and "drying said labelled reagent onto a port of said test strip." Id.
76. Idat 1382.
77. Id. at 1377. The Federal Circuit took the definition of the terms in the phrases from
Webster's dictionary prior to looking at the specification. Id. at 1378. The Federal Circuit cited
Texas Digital and Vitronics as the leading cases that disclose the method of claim construction. Id.
at 1378. As such, the Federal Court first looked at the ordinary meaning of the terms and then to the
specification. Id.
78. Id. at 1379. The Federal Circuit stated that it would allow the two meanings from the
dictionary for "on" to be used unless the specification or prosecution history "clearly demonstrates
that only one of the multiple meanings was intended." Id at 1379.
79. Id. at 1382.
80. See, e.g., Brady supra note 21, at 32 (stating that the Federal Court had left for another
day "the level of deference, if any, to be accorded district court Markman determination") ; Paul R.
Gupta & Clifford R. Michel, The Changing Landscape of Business Method Patents; Rush to File
Following 'State Street Bank' ruling continues, While Other Decisions This Year Clarify Key Issues,
234 N. Y. LAW JOURNAL, October 17, 2005, at 8 (stating that "[t]he court also re-affirmed its
procedure of reviewing claim constructions de novo, which has prompted much consternation
among the patent community"); Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28 (stating that "[m]any of the bar
associations that filed amicus briefs in the case argue the current rule makes no sense").
81. See, e.g., Karen Hagberg & Marc J. Perick, Outside Counsel; 'Phillips': Resolving
(Most) Issues on Construing Patent Claims, 234 N. Y LAW JOURNAL 4, July 28, 2005 (stating that
2007]
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which law to apply, or the meaning of the law is in question, does a
judge rule.82 In recent years, the increase in the number of cases heard
by the Federal Circuit has led many to question whether claim
interpretation is really a question of law or fact.
83
1. Markman v. Westivew
84
As previously stated, Markman involved the interpretation of a term
in a patent.85 One of the major rulings of the Supreme Court in this case
was that claim interpretation should be left to the judge.86 The Supreme
Court began its analysis by first determining if patent infringement is an
action at law or one that requires the protection of a jury trial.87 After
not finding an answer to the question in history or precedent, the
Supreme Court decided that the judge is in the best position to decide
claim interpretation issues.88
"as with 'custom and usage' in contract interpretation, this is an issue on which an appellate court
should defer to the trial judge's findings" and "according deference to underlying fact questions,
while reviewing the ultimate conclusion de novo, is something the Federal Circuit already does,
thus harmonizing claim construction with other areas").
82. See Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4.
83. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 21, at 246 (noting a rise in the number of cases reversed by
the Federal Circuit after the Cybro decision that stated claim construction is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo).
84. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
85. See supra note 36-47.
86. Markrnan, 517 U.S. at 373. The Supreme Court stated that the issues in the case were:
[F]irst, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at the
time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was, see, e. g., Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). If the action in
question belongs in the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision
must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it
existed in 1791.
Markman 517 U.S. at 377.
87. Id.at377-391.
88. Id. at 388-389. The Supreme Court stated:
The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and
are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction
in particular is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and
practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper
interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be
right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be. Parker v. Hulme, 18
F. Cas. at 1140. Such was the understanding nearly a century and a half ago, and there is
no reason to weigh the respective strengths of judge and jury differently in relation to the
modem claim; quite the contrary, for the claims of patents have become highly technical
in many respects as the result of special doctrines relating to the proper form and scope
of claims that have been developed by the courts and the Patent Office. Woodward,
Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 765 (1948).
Id. at 388-389.
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2. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc.89
Following the ruling in Markman, the Federal Circuit once again
addressed the issue of whether claim interpretation is a question of law
and thus subject to de novo review.90 Cybor sued FAS Tech for a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidty and
unenforceability of U.S. Patent No. 5,167,837 and FAS Tech,
counterclaimed for infringement of the '837 patent.9' The '837 patent
discloses a "device and method for accurately dispensing industrial
liquids., 92 The invention disclosed in the '837 patent is primarily used
to dispense small volumes of liquid onto semiconductor wafers.93  The
case was heard by a jury which found that the patent claims were not
invalid and that Cybor had literally infringed all claims except 11, 12
and 16, but these three claims were infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.94  The Federal Circuit, following the two-step process as
discussed in Markman, found that the patent had been infringed.95 In
89. 138 F.3d 1448 (1998).
90. Id. Originally the case was being heard by a panel of three judges. Id. at 1451. However,
before the panel was able to rule, the Federal Circuit sua sponte on September 5, 1997 ordered that
this case be heard en banc. Id. at 1451.
91. Id. at 1453.
92. Id. at 1453. One representative claim states:
In a device for filtering and dispensing fluid in a precisely controlled manner, the
combination of:
first pumping means;
second pumping means in fluid communication with said first pumping means; and
filtering means between said first and second pumping means, whereby said first
pumping means pumps the fluid through said filtering means to said second pumping
means;
in which each of said first and second pumping means includes surfaces that contact the
fluid, said surfaces being of materials that are non-contaminating to industrial fluids
which are viscous and/or high purity and/or sensitive to molecular shear; and comprising
means to enable said second pumping means to collect and/or dispense the fluid, or both,
at rates or during periods of operation, or both, which are independent of rates or periods
of operation, or both, respectively, of said first pumping means.
Id. at 1451 (quoting from '837 patent).
93. Id. at 1452. The pump designed by Cybor performs the same function as the claimed
invention. Id.
94. Id. at 1453. Cybor appealed the judgment of the district court in light of the Markman
decision that had been decided during the jury deliberations. Id. The district court denied Cybor's
renewed motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and entered final judgment for FAS Tech. Id. at
1453-54. For a discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, see Martin J. Adelman & Gary L.
Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 673 (1989).
95. Id. The Federal Court used the two step process of first "determin[ing] the scope and
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order to reach this decision, the Federal Circuit first considered whether
claim interpretation is a question of law or fact.96 The Federal Circuit
performed a thorough analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court and
interpreted the decision to state that all claim construction is a question
of law.9 7 However, in reaching this opinion, the Federal Circuit also
acknowledged that past decisions by the Federal Circuit had decided in
several cases that claim interpretation was a question of fact. 98 The
Federal Circuit attempted to dismiss these prior cases as being consistent
with Markman, but the standard of review of claim construction remains
to be a highly debated issue.99
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
The plaintiff, Edward H. Phillips, was the inventor on Patent
4,677,798 entitled "Steel Shell Modules for Prisoner Detention
Facilities." 100 The patent disclosed a method of constructing metal,
96. Id. at 1454.
97. Id. at 1455. The Federal Court argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v.
Westview Industries, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) implicitly states that claim construction is a question
of law. Id. at 1455. The Federal Court reasons that when the Supreme Court stated that "we hold
that the construction of a patent in terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of
the court," the Court was stating that claim construction is a question of law, in total. Id. The
Federal Court also relies on the Supreme Court's decision that expert testimony does not have to be
heard by the jury to be effective. Id. at 1456. The Supreme Court stated that the judge is in a better
position to analyze the patent as an entire document and construe the claims properly. Id. As such,
the Federal Court completely dismissed claim construction as a question of fact. Id. at 1456.
98. Compare Serrano v. Telular Corp., Ill F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Alpex Computer
Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting,
Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); and General Am. Transp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766
(Fed Cir. 1996) with Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555-56
(Fed. Cir. 1997), overruled by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Serrano,
Ill F.3d at 158 (Mayer, J., concurring); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir.
1996), overruled by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Metaullics Sys.
Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996), overruled by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138
F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit thus felt it necessary to attempt to resolve this
conflict with this decision. Id. at 1454-55.
99. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 21, at 246. (stating that the reversal rate increased after
Cybor, probably because judges were not able to perform claim construction like the Federal Court
had hoped); Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4 (stating that Cybor's "new regime" has not worked but has
resulted in high reversal rates, costs and uncertainity and Cybor should be overruled).
100. Steel Shell Module for Prisoner Detention Facilities, U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr.
14, 1986) (issued Jul. 7, 1987). The patent discloses "vandalism resistant building modules suitable
for detention and secured storage facilities provide good architectural properties and significant
resistance to noise, fire and impact." Id.
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modular wall panels for use in prison facilities.' O' Phillips' invention
was different from present facility construction practices. 0 2  Phillips'
patent disclosed using internal baffles to bear load, eliminate a thermal-
acoustical path and deflect projectiles that may impact upon the wall.
103
Phillips disclosed his patent to AWH and afterwards Phillips discovered
AWH was using his design in prison construction.
104
B. Procedural History
1. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
Phillips brought suit on February 3, 1997 against AWH for patent
infringement and trade secret misappropriation. 10 5 Phillips alleged that
AWH had infringed claims 1, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 of patent
4,467,798.106 The district court concluded that Phillips was barred by
101. Id.
102. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212 (CBS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *1, *4
(D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2002), rev'd en banc, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Two prevailing methods
of manufacturing prison facilities use are the "sandwich panels" and the "steel stud panels"
methods. Id. The sandwich panel utilized sheets of metal skin over insulation. Id. This method is
able to control sound and temperature, but is not adequate for bearing load or resisting fires. Id.
Steel stud panels are an improvement over the sandwich panels because steel studs are placed
between the panels to allow the wall to bear more load. Id. However, the steel studs also provide a
thermal-acoustical path from one panel to the other and thus result in poor sound isolation and
temperature control. Id.
103. Phillips, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 27298, at *1. Phillip's design uses a thermal-acoustical
sealant between the two opposing panels and internal baffles at angles other than 90 degrees. Id.
The baffles did not contact both exterior panels and thus do not provide an acoustical path from one
panel to the other. Id. The baffles also are able to provide resistance to bullets and other projectiles
by deflecting the bullets or projectiles. Id.
104. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated by Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir., 2004). In 1989, Phillips entered into a contract with AWH
Corporation, Hopeman Brothers, Inc., and Lofton Corporation (Collectively "AWH"). Id. The
agreement between AWH and Phillips was for the marketing and selling of Phillips' new design.
Id. The agreement between Phillips and AWH expired on 1990 and the following year Phillips
obtained a brochure from AWH that showed a panel design similar to that disclosed by Phillips to
AWH. Id. Phillips attempted several times to resolve the issue. Id.
105. Phillips, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *1. A "Markman" hearing was conducted on
October 3, 2000. Id. A Markman hearing is the common term used to describe a claim construction
hearing as required by the United States Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517
U.S. 370 (1996). Id. at *2.
106. Id. at *3. The disputed claims state:
Claim 1. Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire sound and
impact resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing records and person,
comprising in combination, an outer shell of substantially parallelepiped shaped with
two outer steel plate panel sections of greater surface area serving as inner and outer
walls for a structure with a plurality of the modules are fitted together, sealant means
2007]
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the statute of limitations from bringing this cause of action regarding
trade secret misappropriation.10 7  The district court also construed the
meaning of the claims in question and found that the defendant AWH,
had not infringed the '798 patent.' 08 Phillips appealed from the dismissal
spacing the two panel sections from steel to steel contact with each other by a thermal-
acoustical barrier material, and further means disposed inside the shell for increasing its
load bearing capacity comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel
shell walls.
Claim 21. A prisoner detention facility providing vandalism resistance constructed of
modular shells having outer steel plate wall panels welded together to provide unitary
inner and outer steel walls and internal baffles with the modular shells enclosing
insulating material providing substantial thermal, sound and impact resistance.
Claim 22. Modular equipment for formulating detention structures comprising of a
multiplicity of interchangeable modules of similar size having steel plate inner and outer
wall sections defining end closures and internally directed load supported baffles with
said modules welded together to form said detention structure.
Claim 24. Modular equipment as defined in claim 22 including insulation material
inside the modules for resisting fire, sound and impact.
Claim 25. Modular equipment as defined in claim 22 including modular shape for
abutting modules end to end in registration to meet substantially only along two welded
lines appearing at the inner and outer wall outer surfaces, wherein the multiplicity of
modules are welded together along the two weld lines.
Claim 26. Modular equipment as defined in claim 22 including means defined in the end
closures disposing thermal insulation between the inner and outer walls to interrupt steel
to steel contact."
Id. at *17 - *19.
107. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-N-212 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 1999) (Trade Secret
Misappropriation Decision) The court reasoned that Phillips knew or should have known of his
alleged injury and failed to exercise due diligence in pursing his claim of misappropriation." Id. at 7.
In the same opinion, the court also found that AWH had not engaged in wrongful acts to prevent
Phillips from bringing his claim. Id. at 7-8.
108. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25199 (D. Colo. Jan. 22,
2003) (Noninfringement Decision). Based on the district court's construction of the claims in the
'798 patent, Phillips determined that it could not prove infringement. Id. at 1. The court determined
the disputed claims as follows:
Claim 1 'Impact resistant' is construed as pertaining to projectiles such as bullets and
bomb fragments. 'Substantially parallelepiped shaped' means a six-sided parallelogram
in which the end panels are neither parallel to each other nor perpendicular to the face
walls. The phrase 'steel plate panel sections of greater surface area serving as inner or
outer walls for a structure when a plurality of the modules are fitted together' is not
limited to the embodiment described in Claims 4 through 16 nor as reflected in Figures
4, 5 and 6 where the modules are constructed with the assembly of three triangularly
shaped pieces. 'Sealant' is not limited to glass fiber rope. 'Internal steel baffle' means a
structure obstructing, impeding or checking the flow of heat and projectiles such as
bullets or bomb fragments deployed toward the interior of the module at an angle of
other than 90 degrees and when fully assembled forms an intermediate, interlocking, but
not solid barrier.
Claim 21. The term 'modular steel shells having outer steel plate wall panels['] is not
limited to the triangular shape reflected in Figures 4, 5 and 6 or described in Claims 4
through 20. Insulating material providing substantial thermal, sound or impact resistance
does not require an intermediate interlocking barrier.
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of the trade secret misappropriation claim and the motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement.109
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Phillips appealed to the Federal Court claiming that the claim
construction used by the district court and the dismissal of the trade
secret misappropriation claim was in error. 110 The majority concluded
that the district court erroneously considered the term "baffle" to be a
means-plus-function, but this error was not sufficient enough to find that
AWH infringed the '798 patent.111 The dissenting view, by Circuit
Judge Dyk, stated that the court constructed the meaning of the term
"baffle" too narrowly by limiting its meaning to that described in the
Claim 22. The phrase 'inner or outer wall sections defining end closure and internally
directed load supporting baffles' does not mean that the wall need be configured by use
of three triangular shapes as in Figures 4, 5 and 6, however, baffle is defined as in Claim
1.
Claim 24. No interpretation is required in light of the construction interpretation for
Claim 22.
Claim 25. This language is interpreted to mean that the end closures are configured by
bending the face walls at an angle other than 90 [degrees] but not necessarily creating a
concave surface.
Claim 26. The term 'means defined in the end closure disposing thermal insulation
between the inner and outer walls' is not limited to glass fiber rope.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, No. 97-MK-212, slip op. at *51-'53 (D.
Colo. Nov. 22, 2002) (Claim Construction Order).
109. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1209, withdrawn 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The reasons for the Federal Circuit withdrawing the panel decision will be discussed infra notes
110-30 and accompanying text.
110. 1d. at 1209. Phillips argues that the meaning of terms such as "baffle" and "impact
resistance" should be given their ordinary meaning and not limited to what is described in the
specification. Id. at 1211. AWH countered, that the meaning of the terms "baffle" and "impact
resistance" should be limited to the way these terms are described in the specification. Id. at 1211-
12. Regarding the misappropriation of a trade secret, Phillips argues that the statute of limitations
did not start to toll until Phillips "learned" of the misappropriation. Id. at 1215.
111. Id. at 1212. The claim in question does not "expressly use the word 'means,' thereby
invoking the presumption that §112, P 6 does not apply." Id. The use of the word "baffle" does not
denote means and furthermore the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence does not support the conclusion
that "baffle" is a means-plus-function term. Id. Although the district court incorrectly constructed
the meaning of the term "baffle" the Federal Circuit continued in its analysis of the specification.
Id. at 1212-13. The Federal Circuit stated that the use of baffles in the specification and in the
claims does not disclose baffles orientated at 90 degrees. Id. at 1214. The Federal Circuit based
this ruling on its decision in CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed.
Circ. 2002), that states "[A] claim term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence
shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular
embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as
important to the invention." Id. at 1213.
2007]
21
Jethrow: The Standard of Review in Claim Construction
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
specification." 2 The Federal Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the
trade secret misappropriation claim. 13  Phillips filed a motion for en
banc review and AWH filed a cross appeal.'l4
C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit en banc
Decision
The en banc Federal Circuit denied the motion for rehearing,
granted the motion to rehear the appeal en banc and vacated the
judgment and opinion of the Federal Court's panel decision.'l 5  The
court invited the parties to submit additional briefs directed at seven
questions. 16 Judge Rader consented and added an additional issue for
112. Phillips, 363 F.3d. at 1217 (Dyk J., dissenting in part). Judge Dyk argues that a patent is
not limited to the single embodiment that it describes. Id at 1217 (stating that in Liebel-Flarsheim
Co. v. Medirad Inc., 358 F.3d. 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the Federal Circuit had expressly rejected
the contention that "if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must
just because a patent only describes a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed
as being limited to the embodiment"). Judge Dyk also argues that the patent should not be limited
to the one purpose disclosed in the specification. Id. at 1217-18. Finally, Judge Dyk states that there
is no reason to "supplement the plain meaning of the claim language with a limitation from the
preferred embodiment." Id. at 1218.
113. Id. at 1214-16. Colorado has a three-year statute of limitation for claims of trade secret
misappropriation. Id. at 1215. "The Colorado Supreme Court has stated, with respect to actions in
tort, that 'the statute of limitations begins when the claimant has knowledge of facts which would
put a reasonable person on notice of the nature and extent of an injury and that the injury was
caused by wrongful conduct of another." Mastro v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Colo. 1984).
Although Phillips argues that he did not "know" of AWH's misappropriation until August 1996, the
court reasoned that the letters from Phillips in 1991 and 1992 show Phillips' awareness of AWH's
possible misappropriation. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1215. The court stated that Phillips did not need to
know the specific damage caused to bring his claim. Id. at 1216. The court concluded that
"Phillips' claim for trade secret misappropriation accrued prior to the critical date, February 3, 1994
- three years before the commencement of suit in the district court, and hence out of time." Id.
114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(en banc). Phillips
continues to dispute the finding of the Federal Circuit that the claim construction was correct as
done by the district court. Id. at 13 10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1383-84. The issues invited by the en banc court were:
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing primarily to
technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term
or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification? If both
sources are to be consulted, in what order?
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation, should the
specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only
when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a
clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language in the specification will satisfy
those conditions? What use should be made of general as opposed to technical
dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple
dictionary definitions of the same term? If the dictionary provides multiple potentially
applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to
22
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the parties to consider." 7  Chief Judge Mayer dissented stating that
claim construction is a matter of fact and not law.
118
1. The Majority Opinion
The en banc panel affirmed the district court's judgment regarding
the trade secret misappropriation claim and dismissed AWH's cross
appeal because the finding of noninfringment was in its favor.119 The en
banc panel reversed the opinion of the court regarding the issue of
infringement and remanded the case back to the District Court for
determine what definition or definitions should apply?
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what use
should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim
language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the specification, for
example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of
breadth are disclosed?
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and dissent of
the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two
approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such that there is a dual
restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in
order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of
avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § § 102, 103 and 112?
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in
the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms?
7. Consistent with the Supreme Courts' decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), and our en ban decision in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it appropriate
for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction
rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?
ld. In actuality there are fourteen questions that the Federal Court is inviting parties and amici to
brief. Moore, supra note 21, at 247 n.7. For an analysis of the amicus briefs submittd to the Federal
Circuit, see David Potashnik, Note, Phillips v. A WH: Changing the Name of the Game, 39 AKRON
L. REV. 863, 884-888 (2006). Potashnik classifies the amicus briefs as either favoring the "holistic"
approach, "procedural" approach or looking at both the specification as well as dictionaries. Id.
117. Id. The issue added by Judge Rader states:
Is claim construction amendable to resolution by resort to strictly algorithmic rules, e.g.
specification first, dictionaries first, etc.? Or is claim construction better achieved by
using the order or tools relevant in each case to discern the meaning of terms according
to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, thus
entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or statute?
Phillips, 376 F.3d. at 1383 (Radar, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 1384 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Mayer stated that the court should
reconsider its decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 F.3d 967, that claim
construction is a matter of law and subject to de novo review. Id. Chief Judge Mayer states that
claim construction is an issue of fact that should be determined by a district court and the appellate
court should only review for clear error. Id.
119. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20071
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further proceedings.120  The majority opinion, written by Judge Bryson,
agreed with the panel decision that the term "baffle" should not be
interpreted as a means-plus-function. 12  Judge Bryson then discussed
the steps in claim interpretation.' 22  Based on the outlined steps, the
court concluded that the district court did not follow the proper claim
interpretation procedure and therefore the case should be remanded back
to the district court for further proceedings.
123
2. The Concurring Opinion
Circuit Judge Lourie both concurred and dissented to the majority's
view. 24  Judge Lourie joined the opinion of the majority that
dictionaries are extrinsic evidence that should not be given more weight
than the specification during claim construction. 125  Judge Lourie also
agreed with the Majority that claims do not have to be limited to specific
or preferred embodiments, but they are limited by what is in the overall
disclosure of the specification.
26
120. Id. at 1328.
121. id. at 1311. The term "baffle" as used in the specification and claims references a
particular structure and not a general structure. Id. Furthermore, the lack of the term "means"
creates a "rebuttable presumption that section 112, paragraph 6, does not apply." Id (relying on
Personalized Media Communs., LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 703-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
122. Id. at 1312-19. The first step in claim interpretation is to give the terms the "meaning that
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1313. The next
step is to give the term the meaning that a person skilled in the art would use. Id. at 1314. The
terms are then interpreted in the context of the surrounding words in the claim, in view of the entire
specification and the patent prosecution history. Id. at 1314-17. Next, extrinsic evidence, such as
dictionaries, learned treatises and expert and inventor testimony are considered but are "less
significant than the intrinsic record in determining 'the legal operative meaning of claim language."'
Id. at 1317 (relying on C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
and quoting Vanderlande Indus. Nederland B V v. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
123. Id. at 1324-28. The court reasoned that the term "baffles" should not be read restrictively
to meet all the specified functions. Id. at 1326-27. The court concluded that "a person of skill in the
art would not interpret the disclosure and claims of the '798 patent to mean that a structure
extending inward from one of the wall faces is a "baffle" if it is at an acute or obtuse angle, but is
not a "baffle" if it is disposed at a right angle." Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1327.
124. Id. at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. Id. Judge Lourie's concurrence emphasizes that the role of the Federal Court is to
determine the method that the district court is to follow in claim construction. Id. The district court
is not to follow the dissenting view in Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1216-1218 (Dyk, J., dissenting), of using
the dictionary meaning prior to considering the specification. Id. But the district court is the follow
the method of the majority in Phillips, 363 F.3d. at 1211-14, and first look to the specification and
only consider the extrinsic evidence, such as the dictionary, when the specification is vague. Id
126. ld.
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3. The Dissenting Opinions
Circuit Judge Lourie's dissent stated that the case should not be
remanded back to the trial court for a determination of infringement. 27
Judge Lourie reasoned that a reading of the specification does not
disclose the use of baffles at any angle other than 90 degrees.1 28 Circuit
Judge Newman also joined Circuit Judge Lourie in dissenting from the
majority's decision to perform another claim construction aside from
that performed by the district court.129 Judge Mayer, however, wrote a
separate dissent that was joined by Circuit Judge Newman. 30  Judge
Mayer's dissent stated his belief that claim construction is a question of
fact and not of law.' 31 Questions of fact are best handled by the trial
court, and not the appellate court. 132 Judge Mayer had been consistent in
his belief that claim construction is a question of fact and not law.' 33
127. Id. at 1328-30. (Lourie, J., dissenting in part) Judge Lourie argues that the role of the
Federal Circuit in this case was to rule on the method of claim construction, i.e. the weight to be
given to dictionaries in claim construction. Id. at 1329. The panel decision of the Federal Circuit
had affirmed the district court's approach of considering the specification first, before looking to the
dictionary's plain meaning. Id. As such, the Federal Circuit, sitting en bane, should have affirmed
the district court's decision by simply stating that the correct method of claim construction had been
followed Id. However, Judge Lourie sees the en bane's decision as replacing the claim
construction of the district court with that of the en banc's court for no legitimate reason. Id. Judge
Lourie concludes by saying that the Federal Court should have "lean[ed] toward affirmance of a
claim construction in the absence of a strong conviction of error." Id. at 1330.
128. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). Judge Lourie references several
statements in the patent that the baffles are "disposed at such angles that bullets which might
penetrate the outer steel panels are deflected." Id. at 1329. The objective of the design, to deflect
bullets can only be accomplished by placing baffles at angles other than 90 degrees. Id.
129. Id. at 1328.
130. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., dissenting) Mayer's dissent is premised on his
belief that claim construction is a question of fact and not law. Id. at 1330. Judge Mayer dissent
more strongly echoes his dissent in Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384 (Mayer, J., dissenting), that the
Federal Circuit should reconsider its ruling in Markman, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane),
aff'don other grounds, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) and Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) that claim construction is a question of law.
131. Id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer states that the process has been
undermined when the appellate court reviews decisions of the district court, in issues concerning
claim construction, de novo. Id. Judge Mayer sees the decision of the court as an attempt to justify
a conclusion it has already reached. Id. at 1330. Judge Mayer states that the court should follow
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and review questions of fact for clear error only. Id. at 1332.
132. Phillips, 376 F3d at 1334. By treating claim construction as a question of law, the courts
have increased litigation costs, used excessive judicial resources and reduced the accuracy of the
judicial process. Id. The present process has the district court deciding causes that the appellate
court will review later and this is a waste of time and resources. Id. Studies show that the "current
reversal rate [for district court claim construction] is 35 percent to 40 percent, and the probability of
reversal depends on which judges you get on appeal." Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28.
133. See e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d. 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Mayer, C.,
dissenting); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., 138 F.3d at 1463-1472 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (stating the
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This opinion has been echoed by others desiring that courts provide
practioners with a consistent understanding of how courts will interpret
claims in a patent.
134
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Claim construction properly explained in Phillips v. A WH Corp.
The Federal Circuit's holding in Phillips v. A WH Corporation
addresses the minor issue of dictionaries as extrinsic evidence while
completely ignoring the important issue of whether claim construction is
a question of law or fact. 135  Claim construction has always been a
difficult task, whether done by a judge or a jury, because of the difficulty
in describing physical inventions with words. 136  Without making the
claims so broad that every possible invention is covered, the court
should give the inventor the broadest claim construction possible. 137 The
claim construction is not a pure legal question, but a combination of both legal and factual
determinations and deference should be given to the district court's factual conclusions); Fromson
v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled by Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Tech., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that absent clear error, district court's findings
should be affirmed); and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997), overruled by, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating that the Federal Circuit will give deference to the trial court's determination of the weight to
give an expert's testimony to clarify ambiguous claim terms).
134. See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28 ("Many of the bar associations that filed amicus
briefs in the case argue the current rule makes no sense. They believe that claim construction isn't
simply a matter of law; it is extremely fact-specific, and only the trial judge gets to see all the
evidence first-hand."); Gupta, supra note 80, at 8 ("The court also re-affirmed its procedure of
reviewing claim construction de novo, which has prompted much consternation among the patent
community, as recognized by the dissent."); Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4 (admonishing the Federal
Circuit to adopt the standing that claim construction is a question of fact not law).
135. Brady, supra note 21, at 32 (praising the Federal Circuit for clarifying the rules regarding
dictionary use for claim construction but admitting that the "en bane opinion leaves important
questions undecided"). See also, Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4 (stating that the court did address the
seven questions it posed in its previous decision but "pass[ed] on the question of the proper standard
of review for claim construction") and Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28 (stating that the Federal
Circuit's decision to forego discussion on the amount of deference to give lower court's claim
construction leaves an important question unanswered). The Federal Court appears to state that the
issue is settled when it says that "[a]fter consideration of the matter, we have decided not to address
that issue at this time." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1328.
136. Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 722
(2002). In its discussion concerning the doctrine of equivalents, the court engages in a discussion of
the inadequacy of words to describe patents. Id. at 722. The court acknowledges that if words were
given their literal meaning, it would be simple for others to invent around the claims of the patent.
Id. at 722. The court, therefore, states that techniques such as the doctrine of equivalents should be
used to widen the scope of claims to encompass the true intentions of the inventor. Id. at 722.
137. Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In
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Federal Circuit's decision in Phillips v. A WH Corp. seeks to find a
balance between placing the proper limits on patent claims while giving
applicants the ability to properly claim their invention. 38 The structured
analysis performed by the Federal Court in Phillips v. A WH Corp. is the
type of structure that should have been applied in Markman v. Westview
Instruments. 
39
Although many scholars held Markman v. Westview Instruments to
be a milestone ruling in patent prosecution, 40 it failed in one respect: to
explicitly define what weight to give extrinsic versus intrinsic
evidence.14' By leaving this determination to the lower courts, the
Supreme Court was giving these courts the ability to make this
determination on a case by case basis. 42  When the higher courts give
Autogiro the court discusses the inadequacy of words to describe inventions. Id. at 396. The court
should not be restricted to just the words of the claim, but by looking at all relevant documents
along with the patent. Id. at 397. The court discusses that three revelant documents are the
specification, drawings and the file wrapper. Id. at 397. However, in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, the court acknowledges that extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries will provide proof
of the prior art at the time of the invention. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 52 F.3d 967,
980.
138. Philips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303, 1321. The court discusses its concern that
the claim construction technique of using the dictionary first, as developed in Texas Digital v.
Telegenix, results in claims that are too broad. Id. at 1321.
139. id. at 1312. The court, out of fear that prior decisions have unduly expanded the scope of
claim interpretation, seeks to define the amount of weight that should be given to extrinsic evidence.
Id.at 1316-1319. The Federal Court admits that it was not clear in its prior decisions on the proper
methods of claim construction. Id. at 1312.
140. CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 18.03[l]. Three major court decisions have shaped the
present patent system and how claims are interpreted: Autogiro Co. of America v. United States,
SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America and Markman v. Westview Instruments.
Id. Autogiro discusses "claim interpretation and reviewed the basic principles of patent
infringement, including the doctrine of equivalents and file wrapper (prosecution history) estoppel."
Id. SRI International explains "claim interpretation and application, illustrat[ing] the continuing
difficulties of achieving consistency and predictability in the interpretation and application of claim
language." Id. Markman has been held by many to explain the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
interpretation. Id.
141. CHISUM, supra note 12, at 18.03[ 1 ][c]. The court goes into an in depth discussion of what
extrinsic evidence is, i.e., expert testimony, dictionaries and learned treatises. Id.
142. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 980-981. The court in Markman lists
several examples of how courts have applied the use of extrinsic evidence on a case by case basis as
shown in:
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546, 20 L. Ed. 33 (1871) (reviewing a
decree in equity); see United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233, 55
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381, 384, 87 L. Ed. 232, 63 S. Ct. 165 (1942) (the court construed the
claim by relying in part on the testimony of one of the patentees as the "clearest
exposition of the significance which the terms employed in the claims had for those
skilled in the art"); U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315
U.S. 668, 678, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 6, 10, 86 L. Ed. 1105, 62 S. Ct. 839 (1942) (It is
permissible, and often necessary, to receive expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of a
20071
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too much flexibility in an area of law that is still in its adolescence,
lower trial courts are sure to stray from the path and create their own
interpretation of what the proper claim construction method should be. 
43
B. Past inconsistent decisions properly addressed by Phillips v. A WH
Corp.
The application of the decision in Markman to subsequent
proceedings shows the variability that resulted from the Supreme
Court's lack of a standardized method of claim construction.1
44
technical or scientific term or term of art so that the court may be aided in
understanding... what [the instruments] actually say.); Winans v. New York & Erie
R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 101 (Professors or mechanics cannot be received to prove
to the court or jury what is the proper or legal construction of any instrument of writing.
A judge may obtain information from them, if he desire it, on matters which he does not
clearly comprehend, but cannot be compelled to receive their opinions as matter of
evidence.); Marsh v. Quick-Meal Stove Co., 51 F. 203 (C.C.D. Mo. 1892) (It is the
province of the court to construe the claims of the patent that has been offered in
evidence. That construction, of course, is to be made in light of such expert testimony as
has been offered.); 3 Robinson on Patents, § § 1012-15, 1019-20; accord Seattle Box
Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568,
573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (A trial judge has sole discretion to decide whether or not he needs,
or even just desires, an expert's assistance to understand a patent. We will not disturb
that discretionary decision except in the clearest case.); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 887 F.2d 1070, 1076, 12 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1539, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (The purpose of expert testimony is to provide
assistance to the court in understanding, when the claims are technologically complex or
linguistically obscure, how a technician in the field, reading the patent, would understand
the claims.).
Id. at 980-81.
143. See e.g., Moore, supra note 21, at 246-47 (stating that "[w]ith judicial claim construction
now nearing its adolescence (eight years from the Supreme Court's Markman and ten years from the
Federal Circuit's Markman), there should be more predictability"); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v.
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., concurring) ("Our
decisions provide inadequate guidance as to when it is appropriate to look to the specification to
narrow the claim by interpretation and when it is not appropriate to do so. Until we provide better
guidance, I fear that the lower courts and litigants will remain confused."); William F. Lee & Anita
K.Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH 55, 67 (1999) ("Although, according to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court, Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, predictability, and certainty in patent
litigation, many believe that the holding has had the opposite effect."); Erik Paul Belt, Federal
Circuit Stresses Ordinary Meaning: In Recent Cases, The Court has Limited the Narrowing of
Claims, Often Benefiting Patent Owners, NATL'L L.J. , Sept. 22, 2003, at S1, S14 (stating that
"many feel that Markman has not yet led to the hoped-for certainty in claim construction"); Victoria
Slind-Flor, Judges Receive Mixed Reviews on Handling of Patent Claims, N.Y.L.J., March 14,
2002, at 1 ("By most accounts, the Markman decision has added uncertainty, costs and delay to a
system that already had plenty of all three.").
144. Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967, 981. The Federal Appellate Court discusses the
extensive use of extrinsic evidence in helping to "resolve disputes in route to pronouncing the
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However, the Federal Circuit's decision in Phillips addresses many of
the misconceptions of the Texas Digital court and brings claim
construction back in line with traditional patent law and policy. 145 First,
the court in Phillips begins by acknowledging the role of the integral
parts of the patent to the claim construction. 146 In contrast, the court in
Texas Digital first looked outside of the specification to determine the
ordinary meaning of the word. 147 Although this may seem like a simple
and harmless step, it begins the analysis in the wrong direction by giving
the presumption to the dictionary definition before looking to the
specification. 148  The Phillips court addresses this issue head-on by
stating that the presumption should always be in favor of the
specification over any other extrinsic information. 1
49
meaning of claim language." Id. at 98 1. The court reasoned that the extrinsic evidence is often
necessary to help the trial court understand the meaning of the patent. Id. at 981. The Appellate
Court concluded that the district court's claim construction, while taking into account extrinsic
evidence, is still "based upon the patent and prosecution history." Id. at 981.
145. See infra notes 140-50, and accompanying text
146. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1311-12. The Federal Court acknowledges that, as
described in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, the specification of the patent is the area where the
patentee describes his invention whereas the claims is the area that the patentee points out the
subject matter which the patentee regards as the invention. Id. at 1311-12. The specification must
be detailed enough to enable one skilled in the art to create the invention. ADELMAN, supra note 15,
at 438-39.
147. Texas Digital, Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d at 1206 (stating that the Federal Circuit
panel began its construction of the term "repeatedly" by first looking at the relevant dictionary
definition). In determining the meaning of each of the disputed words in the specification the
Federal Circuit panel first looked to the dictionary and then to the specification to determine if the
specification was consistent with the dictionary. Id. at 1205-1216. One commentator is quoted as
saying that this approach, in an of itself, gave "the broadest applicable dictionary definition to
construe patent terms, often giving patent owners exceptionally wide rights." Seidenberg, supra
note 67, at 28. However, another commentator worries that the dictionary first approach "can be
grossly out of context." Jennifer K. Bush, John E. Gartman, Elizabeth I. Rogers, Six Patent Law
Puzzlers, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1,12 (Fall 2004). Bush goes on to argue that construing a
phrase is more than just taking each of the individual words in the phrase in determining their
meaning. Id. Also, the date a dictionary was published may have a significant effect on the
meaning of the words included in the dictionary. Id.
148. See e.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (stating that the claimed invention is to be described
in the description in enough detail to enable one skilled in the art to make or use it). A patent would
therefore not be complete if a person skilled in the art had to look outside of the patent to determine
what the invention was. ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 438-39 (stating that one of the key
requirements of a patent specification is that it enable one skilled in the art to make the invention).
The court in Texas Digital, by allowing the construing of the claims to begin by looking outside of
the specification is greatly expanding the scope of the claimed invention. Id. at 439.
149. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1317 (stating that although some extrinsic evidence
can assist in the determination of meanings in a claim, the extrinsic evidence is always given lower
weight than the intrinsic evidence such as the specification). Paul W. Garrity commented that the
Phillips decision "elevate[d] the importance of the specification and the prosecution history to the
determination of infringement." Paul W. Garrity and Steve Z. Szczepanski, Federal Circuit
2007]
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The Phillips court also limits the coverage of claims in the patent in
a proper manner. 150  In contrast, the court in Texas Digital allowed the
inclusion of terms from the dictionary that may have no relevance to the
claimed invention.1 51 Once again, the Phillips court addresses this head-
on by stating that this expansion in coverage can take the invention in a
direction never contemplated by the inventor.1 52 One of the key policy
Decisions Place a Premium on Lawyering; Careless drafting and prosecuting of patent applications
is now likely to lead to severely limited scope coverage, 234 N. Y. LAW JOURNAL 2 (October 17,
2005). For examples of courts using the explicit definition of a term in the patent to overrule the
dictionary definition refer to In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and Intellicall, Inc.
v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
150. But see, e.g., Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. (stating that the Federal Circuit's limitation in
Phillips is over limiting and will result in increased costs in drafting of patents and in many
inventors losing their rights to their inventions due to claims drafted using the pre-Phillip's
techniques). In opposition to the view stated by Garrity, see also Bush, supra note 147, at 12
("Even when dictionaries dated at the time of invention are used, meaning - particularly in contexts
involving rapidly developing technology - may have evolved among those of ordinary skill in the
art faster than it was documented in any dictionary, technical or otherwise."). One possible solution
to the fixing of the meaning of terms in a patent is to fix the disputed claim term based on its
meaning at the time of infringement. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim
Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101,103 (Oct. 2005). However, Lemley argues in his paper that best
approach is to fix the meaning of terms in a claims based on the meaning of term at the time of
filing of the patent application. Id. at 119-20. Presently, the meaning of terms in a patent vary
based on the issue being resolved, novelty or nonobviousness, enablement or written description,
means-plus-function, or infringement. Id. at 102-03. In determining the legal issue of novelty or
nonobviousness, the courts have traditional fixed the meaning of claim based on the meaning of the
terms at the time of invention. Id. at 103. If enablement or the written description are at issue, the
courts use the meaning of the terms at the time the patent was filed. Id. If the court is determining
the extent of a means-plus-function term, the terms are fixed based on their meaning at the time the
patent issues. ld. Finally, if infringement is at issue, courts have typically fixed the meaning of the
claim based on the term's meaning at the time of infringement. Id.
151. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. (stating that the old approach to claim construction allowed
the patentee to present additional data to the patent during infringement hearings and not be limited
to the intrinsic evidence as required by the Phillips court). Often patentees attempt to take
advantage of a court's both broad and narrow construction of claims. Lemley, supra note 150, at
110. When determining the validity of a patent in the prosecution phase before the Patent and
Trademark Office, the patentee often looks for a narrow interpretation of the terms "to avoid the risk
of either treading on the prior art or claiming more than the patentee has enabled or described." Id.
However, when the patentee is involved in an infringement suit, the patentee seeks a broad meaning
of the same claims in order to show that the claims cover the accused defendant's products. Id.
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit has attempted to limited this double meaning of claims. Id. at 110-
11.
152. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1313. Courts have stated that it is "unjust to the
public, as well as an invasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import
of its terms." White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886); see also Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) ("the claims measure the invention"). The Phillips court also
appears to answer the question of when the meaning of terms in a patent should be defined.
Lemely, supra note 150, at 119. Although in dictum, the court states "[w]e have made clear,
moreover, that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term
would have to a person of orinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of
[1:65
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goals of patents is to provide the public with new and innovative
inventions but at the expense of giving the inventor a limited
monopoly. 53  The approach of the court in Texas Digital completely
ignores this policy goal by allowing inventors to claim more than they
disclosed and prevents the public from really knowing what is
claimed. 154  The Texas Digital court also completely ignored one basic
problem that it was creating by its method of claim construction, which
dictionary to use?155 By beginning with the dictionary as the basis for
claim construction, the court will have opened itself up to a vast number
of dictionaries, each claiming the meaning of the word to be something
different. 56
The treatment of dictionaries as both intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence is proof of the confusion that has resulted from the Federal
Court not providing clear direction to the district courts.'57 In Vitronics,
the Federal Circuit determined that the best way to interpret the claims
the effective filing date of the patent specification." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1313.
Although this was stated in dictum, one commentator, Lemley, has argued that it is the correct time
at which to fix the meaning of terms in a patent claim. Lemley, supra note 150, at 119-21. The
meaning of the terms should be fixed at the time of filing, and the court should use the doctrine of
equivalents to cover any later-developed technologies. Id.
153. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1313 (stating that the specification must include a
portion of the invention that the inventor intends to claim).
154. ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 439 ("The enablement requirement serves to delimit the
boundaries of patent protection by ensuring that the scope of a patent claim accords with the extent
of the inventor's technical contribution."). See also, Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247-
48 (1832) (stating that the statute "requires, as preliminary to a patent, a correct specification and
description of the thing discovered. This is necessary in order to give the public, after the privilege
shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power to
issue the patent.").
155. See generally, Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (using several
different dictionaries to construe the meaning of terms in conflict).
156. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1321 ("Dictionaries, by their nature, provide an
expansive array of definitions."). For an expansive analysis of the diferrent types of dictionaries
used in claim construction by the Federal Circuit see Joseph Scott Miller and James A Hilsenteger,
The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 829 (April 2005).
157. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The
court in Texas Digital held that
[b]y examining relevant dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises to ascertain possible
meanings that would have been attributed to the words of the claims by those skilled in
the art, and by further utilizing the intrinsic record to select from those possible
meanings the one or ones most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor, the
full breadth of the limitations intended by the inventor will be more accurately
determined and the improper importation of unintended limitations from the written
description into the claims will be more easily avoided.
Id. The court in essence is escalating the dictionary from being extrinsic evidence to intrinsic.
CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 18.03[ I][C].
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was by looking at the specification over the testimony of experts. 58 It
should be noted that the court's ruling was based on the weighing of the
specification versus expert testimony and not the specification versus the
dictionary meaning. 159 The Vitronics court makes it clear that dictionary
definitions are not the same as expert testimony.1 60  The Vitronics court
does not create a "quasi-implicit" category for dictionaries, but it uses
the method that was later explicitly described in Phillips, placing
dictionaries in their proper place, below the specification.' 6'
In Phillips v. A WH Corporation, the Federal Court has finally put
an end to the "hide and seek" game by placing dictionaries below the
specification. 162  The Texas Digital court attempted to argue that
dictionaries are more reliable and objective guides than other extrinsic
evidence. 163  However, the Phillips court outlines five reasons why
158. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The trial
court had relied on the testimony of expert witnesses and employees of the applicant to determine
the meaning of several critical terms in the patent application. Id. The appellate court, based on its
analysis, found that the specification properly defined these terms and that to allow the applicant to
introduce evidence that was clearly contrary to the specification is "unnecessary and, hence, legally
incorrect." Id.
159. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. The court stated that the applicants' reliance on opinion
testimony should be limited. Id. The court recognized that opinion testimony is "no better than
opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms." Id. However, the court did distinguish
dictionaries and prior art documents from opinion testimony when it stated "[u]nlike expert
testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance of litigation. They are to be
preferred over opinion testimony, whether by an attorney or artisan in the field of technology to
which the patent is directed." Id.
160. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. The court in Texas Digital also stated that "[s]uch references
are unbiased reflections of common understanding not influenced by expert testimony or events
subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives
of the parties, and not inspired by litigation." Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. The court further
argued that this type of evidence, dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are the most helpful to
judges in "better understanding the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art
to describe the technology." Id.
161. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (stating that claims are construed by first looking at the
specification, then extrinsic evidence if required).
162. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-1319. The court in Philips, after an in depth discussion of the
various kinds of extrinsic evidence states that "[i]n sum, extrinsic evidence may be useful to the
court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered
in the context of the intrinsic evidence." Id. at 1319.
163. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d 1202. The court in Texas Digital stated that:
[d]ictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings
that would have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms
used by the inventor in the claims. Id. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]echnical treatises and dictionaries... are worthy
of special note. Judges are free to consult such resources at any time.., and may also
rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms..."); Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d
at 1459 (citing Vitronics for the proposition that a court is free to consult dictionaries,
encyclopedias, and treatises at any time to help determine the meaning of claim terms);
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extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, is less reliable than the
specification and other intrinsic evidence. 64  Therefore, the only
sensible approach to using dictionaries in claim construction is to first
give weight to the specification, only when the specification is not clear
should definitions in dictionaries be consulted. 1
65
C. Policy arguments in favor of dictionaries as extrinsic evidence
There are several policy considerations that should be considered in
the use of dictionaries as extrinsic evidence including the ability of the
applicant as his own lexicographer 166 and the encouragement to patent
drafters to be clear and concise in their claim drafting. 167 Patent law saw
the need for a system that met each of the policy considerations in a
Vanguard Prods. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370, 1372, (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(A dictionary is not prohibited extrinsic evidence, and is an available resource of claim
construction.).
Id.
164. Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d at 1318-19. The five basic reasons dictionaries are less
reliable than the specification are 1) the dictionary was not created at the time the patent was
created, 2) dictionaries may not have been written by a person skilled in the arts, 3) some extrinsic
evidence, like testimonies, are created for litigation and thereby are biased in their opinion, 4)
parties will only choose the extrinsic evidence that is beneficial to their cause, and 5) extrinsic
evidence can be used to undermine the patent and thus reduce the ability of the patent to provide
public notice of the invention. Id.
165. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. The court, however, does place a limit on the use of
dictionaries. Id. The court acknowledges that dictionaries often have more then one meaning and
that the "intrinsic evidence must always be consulted to identify which of the different possible
dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by the
inventor" Id. (emphasis added). Only if all the meanings are consistent with the use in the intrinsic
record could the applicant use each meaning. Id.
166. Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731-
732. In Festo, the court commented on the inadequacies of words to describe an invention when it
stated that:
The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or
describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant
and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to
inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule
of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily
the most efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.
Id. at 731-732. Therefore, as the court states, words should be given their fair scope to allow the
patent applicant to properly define his invention and prevent others from drafting claims that avoid
the words of the patent but infringe on the meaning of the claims. Id. at 731.
167. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966). In Graham, the court remarks on the
importance of patents to the advancement of society. Id. at 9. Jefferson, one of the key influences
on the current patent system, stated that patents are an "award to bring forth new knowledge." Id. at
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manner that was fair both to society and to the inventor.' 68
1. Patent drafters as their own lexicographer
The patent system was created with several goals in mind, one such
goal was to promote the progress of science and technology.
169
However, in order to promote the progress of science and technology,
patents must be written in ways that provide the public with inventions
that can be utilized in the future.1 70 Due to the constantly changing state
of technology, it is important that patent drafters be given the flexibility
to create words that accurately describe the inventions.'17  The decision
in Phillips places the burden on patent drafters to adequately describe
the invention, knowing that if the specification does not adequately
describe the invention, the inventor is opening himself up to the
discretion of the judge in determining which extrinsic evidence to allow
in to construe the claim.'
72
168. Id. at 9. Thomas Jefferson stated:
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The
grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society - at odds with the
inherent free nature of disclosed ideas - and was not to be freely given. Only
inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful,
justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.
Id. Martin Adelman states that "[a]t the heart these goals attempt to strike a balance between the
encouragement of the labors that lead to innovation and dissemination of the fruits of those labors."
ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 1.
169. See supra note II and accompanying text. Other policy goals by one commentator have
been explained as "incentive to invent," incentive to disclose," "rent dissipative theory" and "race to
invent." ADELMAN, supra note 15, at 26-38 (summarizing views expressed in Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science. Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1017, 1989).
170. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 167. Thomas Jefferson originally intended that patents be
granted for inventions that were useful to society in order to minimize the "embarrassment" of a
monopoly. Id. However, over time, Jefferson found it more and more difficult to deny patents for
inventions whose benefit to society were not readily evident. Id. The patent system today no longer
requires that the claimed invention provide a defined amount of social benefit, only that it be novel,
non-obvious and useful. Id.
171. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of America. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55 (1967) (discussing the
inability of words to describe inventions). The court in Autogiro stated:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A
verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent
law. This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot
be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it.
The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not
made for the sake words, but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows
the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
Id. at 61-62.
172. Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d at 1319 (stating that extrinsic evidence is much less
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2. Clear and concise claim drafting
The Federal Circuit's decision in Phillips encourages patentees to
ensure that their claim drafting skills are at a level to ensure the
protection for the invention claimed. 173 The benefit of a policy such as
this will ensure that the public is completely aware of the invention to
which it grants a temporary monopoly.174 The patentee will no longer be
able to rely on "soft" rules like the doctrine of equivalents to convince
the courts, after the patent has been drafted to include a scope not clearly
delineated in the patent.175 However, Phillips encourages patent drafters
to stay abreast of the latest court rulings so that they may be able to draft
claims and patents that best protect their client and gives the client the
best opportunity to win suits against infringers.176  Although this may
result in excessively defining terms in a patent, the inventor will be sure
to have a patent that protects her true invention when challenged in
reliable than intrinsic evidence and as such the judge should carefully weigh its use in claim
construction). In warning patentees of the effect of the Phillips' decision, Paul Garrity states that
the skills and the knowledge of lawyers will be key in determining the success or failure of
inventions claimed in patents. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2.
173. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. The change in the rule of claim construction encourages
drafters of patents to play closer attention to the drafting and prosecution of patents. Id. As stated
by Garrity, "it behooves the owner of an invention to find the best legal talent to prepare a well-
drafted, comprehensive patent specification that avoids the pitfalls that have reduced the scope of
the patent coverage in prior cases." Id. Now, a poorly drafted patent may be held to be invalid at
summary judgment and not have the opportunity to convince a judge or jury of its validity by
bringing in once admissible extrinsic evidence. Id.
174. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 9 (discussing the desire of Thomas Jefferson that
patents be granted to inventors in return for the public receiving a benefit from the temporary
monopoly granted.) The Federal Court's decision in Phillips encourages the full disclosure of the
invention to ensure that the public is aware of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at
1323 (stating that it is the goal of the specification to "teach and enable those of skill in the art to
make and use the invention and provide the best mode for doing so"). Id.
175. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. Commentors, such as Garrity, recognize that the importance
of claim drafting and the avoidance of damaging statements during the prosecution of patents has
increased because courts have begun to limit the use of the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Festo
Corp. v. Shotketxu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (showing the Supreme
Court limiting the reach of the doctrine of equivalents through the use of prosecution history
estoppel). The end result is that patentees are often unable to fix mistakes in their claims,
specifications or limit the statements made during the prosecution phase of a patent application.
Garrity, supra note 149, at 2.
176. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. Knowledgeable patentee will be aware of the Federal
Circuit's recent decisions to limit the scope of protection based on prior art, statements made in the
Summary of the Invention, and objectives stated in the specification. Id. Patentees who stay abreast
of recent patent decisions will also be well aware the variations from case to case and the impact
that this will have on their client's patent. Id. (stating that some Federal Circuit cases have even
limited the scope of a patent's claims to the embodiment shown in the specification). However,
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court. 1 77  Of equal importance, the patent drafter will be sure to have
avoided the likelihood of malpractice.1
78
D. Caution in use of dictionaries as extrinsic evidence
The Phillips court, while settling the law on dictionaries as extrinsic
evidence may have created another problem in patent law.179 By placing
more weight on the specification, the Phillips court has put more burden
on patent drafters to be absolutely thorough in the description of the
invention. 180  This burden is needed to make sure that patent drafters
know that if they do not properly draft the specification they may be
doing a disservice to their clients.'18  However, patent drafters only need
point to the Phillips decision to show that the expertise of a patent
drafter is of great value to inventors if they want their inventions
protected. 182 This in turn will allow patent drafters to justify raising their
rates and possibly forcing the average inventor to go into business
without a critical patent for their invention.
183
177. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. Inventors, who consult well trained drafters will be warned
that although other services are cheaper, if the drafter is not aware of the ever changing rules in
patent law, the patent drafted may not be worth the paper it is written on. Id.
178. See generally, Garrity, supra note 149, at 2 (discussing the implications of the changes in
the patent system and the effect that this will have on both clients and patent drafters).
179. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
180. See Garrity, supra note 149, at 2 (discussing the impact of Phillips on the drafting of
patents). Based on the latest developments in patent law, the "scope of patent protection depends
now more than ever on the skills of the patent lawyers who prepare and prosecute patent
applications as opposed to the merits of the invention itself." Id. This appears to go contrary to the
patent policy by making the patent drafting more important than the invention. See generally
Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (discussing the importance of inventions to the growth of
technology in the United States).
181. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2. Garrity states:
[lI]t is more important than ever to carefully craft the patent application during drafting,
and the arguments to the Patent Examiner during prosecution, so that the patent provides
meaningful protection for the claimed invention. The failure to recognize what is needed
and what should be avoided in drafting and prosecuting a patent application is now likely
to lead to a patent that has a severely limited scope of coverage.
Id.
182. See supra note 175.
183. Garrity, supra note 149, at 2 (remarking that many large firms are not aware of the recent
changes in patent law and continue to send their patent drafting to the lowest bidder or even
oversees). However, for those inventors who are not financially able to shop around for the best
patent drafter, they may be forced to either pay the high cost of an adequately patented invention, or
risk losing their inventions to others. See generally, Garrity supra note 149, at 2 (discussing the
impact of Phillips on the drafting of patents).
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E. Judicial Review of Claim Construction - Question of Law or Fact?
Courts have often viewed the review of claim construction as a
question of law. 184  As such, the reviewing court should look at the
evidence de novo.' 85 The review of a lower court's decision, as a matter
of law, allows the higher court to look at all the facts of the case,
construct a meaning of the claimed invention and determine whether
infringement has occurred. 8 6  Although most courts follow the belief
that claim construction is a question of law, there have been strong
opinions stating that claim construction should only be reviewed as a
matter of fact. 187 This standard of review would allow juries and judges
to construe the claims and determine infringement without the fear that
this decision will be reversed by a higher court that was not present
during the presentation of the facts, unless the finding of the jury or
judge is clearly erroneous. 188
184. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389. The court states that "[t]he construction of written
instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors
unburdened by training in exegesis." Id. at 389. The court bases this decision upon the historical
role of the judge to determine the meaning of the claims. Id. at 389. See supra note 98.
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). See, e.g., Cybor, 138 F.3d. at 1456 (stating the question of law will
be reviewed de novo even when allegedly fact-based questions are in issue).
186. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303 (2005) (discussing the Federal Circuits
holding that the claim construction method used by the district court was correct, but replacing the
district court's finding of non-infringement with the Federal Circuit's finding of infringement). See
also Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123-24 (D. Mass. 2001)
("Disappointed litigants and commentators alike have criticized the court for fact-finding and other
forms of hyperactive judging. Increasingly, the bar is expressing concern over the court's decision-
making procedures and its apparent willingness to take over the roles of patent examiner, advocate
and trier of fact.").
187. Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (discussing at length that the
Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), did not affirm that
claim construction was a question of law, only that the judge was in a better position to determine
the meaning of a patent claim). See also, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114
F.3d 1547, 1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Serrano, I1I F.3d at 1586 (Mayer, J., concurring); Wiener v.
NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996), overruled by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs 138
F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998); and Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
overruled by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also, Hagberg, supra
note 81, at 4. Hagberg states that:
[t]he U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 US
370, 372 (1996), held "that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court." Markman is the leading precedent
on certain aspects of claim construction, but a close read reveals that the Court did not
address the issue at hand. The Court stated repeatedly that the issue it faced was only
who should construe the claims: the judge or jury. See, e.g., 517 US at 372, 377, 384,
388. Markman did not mention the standard of review.).
id.
188. See generally, Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4 (outlining a method of claim construction
whereby the trial court would review all the evidence presented by the parties regarding the proper
2007]
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F. Patent Law vs. Other Areas of Law
Patent law is relatively new in comparison to other areas of law.
8 9
The rules and standards of patent law are still being determined in the
Federal Circuit courts and in the Supreme Court.1 90 As such, it is
important that patent law look to other areas of the law and take note of
what has been learned. 91 Other areas of law follow FED. R. CIV. P.
52(a) in determining the standard of review. 92 Circuit Judge Mayer has
made several impressive arguments that the Federal Circuit's present
approach to claim construction is in violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).' 93
In order to bring patent law into harmony with other areas of law, Cybor
should be overruled and claim construction held to be a question of fact
claim construction, construe the claims according to the information presented and be subject to
review only in instances where there has been clear error by the judge or the jury). Hagberg argues
that this methodology will still allow the Federal Circuit to not defer to the trial court if the judge:
(a) limited a claim term to a preferred embodiment just because that was the only
embodiment described: (b) restricted a claim based on statements in the specification
without 'point[ing] to [language] in the claim with which to draw in those statements,
Renshaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998); or
(c) construed a claim differently for invalidity and infringement purposes.
Id.
189. Moore, supra note 21, at 246-47 (stating that claim construction is in its adolescence,
"eight years from the Supreme Court's Markman and ten years from the Federal Circuit's
Markman").
190. See, e.g., recent rulings in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303 (2005) (holding that
dictionaries are extrinsic evidence and should not be given more weight than the specification);
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech.., 138 F.3d 1448 (1998) (holding that claim construction is a question of
law); and Festo Corp. v. Shotketxu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (showing
the Supreme Court limiting the reach of the doctrine of equivalents through the use of prosecution
history estoppel).
191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
192. Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4. Hagberg states:
[flinally, according deference to underlying fact questions, while reviewing the ultimate
conclusion de novo, is something the Federal Circuit already does, thus harmonizing
claim construction with other areas. For instance, "the ultimate determination of
obviousness [is reviewed] de novo, while the underlying factual inquiries are reviewed
for clear error." Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Court
also reviews the conclusion on enablement de novo, but defers on the underlying
findings of fact. Union Pacific Resources v. Chesapeake Energy,236 F.3d 684, 690 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Adopting the authors' approach would harmonize the standard of review on
claim construction with the standard of review on obviousness and enablement. These
areas are all based on underlying facts, and the Federal Circuit should treat them
uniformly.
Id.
193. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1331-32. Judge Mayer states that the Federal Circuit
is obligated "by Rule 52(a) to review the factual findings of the district court that underlie the
determination of claim construction for clear error." Id. See also, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("Review of factual findings under the clearly-erroneous standard-with its
deference to the trier of fact-is the rule, not the exception.").
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reviewable using a clearly erroneous standard. 194
G. Policy Arguments
There are several policy arguments to analyze when determining
that claim construction is a question of fact and not law - court costs
195
and clarity in court decisions.
96
1. Court Costs
With the present standard of review, court costs are almost doubled
when the trial court performs a Markman hearing to construe the claims,
determines infringement and the Federal Court performs the same tasks
when the infringement case is appealed. 197  The additional cost of an
appeal must be factored into every patent drafted, as it is almost a
certainty that the party who loses at trial will appeal to the Federal
Circuit and the parties will be subject to the same presentation of
information as performed for the trial court.
19 8
2. Clarity in Court Decisions
Regarding clarity of court decisions, practioners often take the view
that the trial court is just a gate that they must pass through to get to the
Federal Circuit. 199 The decisions of the trial court often mean nothing as
194. Hagberg, supra note 81, at 4 (stating that Cybor's new regime has had time to work and it
has failed thereby requiring the Federal Court to overrule Cybor's holding that claim construction is
a question of law).
195. See infra notes 197-98, and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 199-200, and accompanying text.
197. Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28. ("Critics also complain that the lack of deference is a
major reason why so many district courts claim constructions are overturned on appeal. This, in
turn, makes patent litigations unduly lengthy, costly and unpredictable.").
198. Id. With the present method of reviewing claim construction as a question of law, the
reversal rate at the Federal Circuit level makes also every patent case subject to an immediate
appeal. Id. "The predominant view [among patent litigators] is that district courts are just a way
station on the way to the Federal Circuit." Id. (quoting David Long, a partner in the Washington,
D.C., office of Howrey). Litigators are more than willing to file for an appeal due to this high
reversal rate. Id. The reversal rate in the Federal Circuit has been calculated to be as high as
34.5%. Moore, supra note 21, at 243-44.
199. Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28. The counsel for Phillips, Carl Manthei states;
[t]he Court of Appeals has gone back to a case-by-case method of claim construction...
That's problematic because going by that method, you got all sorts of different results at
different levels. In this case, for instance, the three-judge panel disagreed among
themselves and with the trial court [over the interpretation of a patent], and the en bane
court disagreed with the panel. That type of thing is going to continue.
2007]
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the Federal Court will often take the case up on appeal and construe the
claims in whatever manner it sees fit.
200
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's ruling in Phillips v. A WH Corporation limits
the use of dictionaries in claim construction.2 0' These limitations
encourage accurate and thorough drafting of claims by practioners and
limit the availability of "soft doctrines" like the doctrine of
equivalents.202 However, for all the good that Phillips provides in claim
construction, it is blind to the elephant in the room. 20 3  The patent
community was in anxious anticipation that the Federal Circuit would
thoroughly consider the question of how much deference to give to
lower court decisions.0 4 But, Judge Mayer stated that the court simply
rearranged the deck chairs, as the Titantic headed for Davey Jones'
Locker. 20 5 Unfortunately, like the Titantic, hope disappeared for Phillips
when the Supreme Court did not take notice of the clear conflict in the
patent community and provide clarity and understanding to a field in
search for direction.20 6
Christopher A. Jethrow*
200. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Federal Court will
"decide cases to whatever mode or method results in the outcome [they] desire, or at least allows
[them] a seemingly plausible way out of the case.").
201. See supra notes 135-83 and accompanying notes.
202. See, e.g., Garrity, supra note 149, at 2.
203. See generally, Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d at 1334-1335 (Mayer, J., dissenting)
204. Seidenberg, supra note 67, at 28 ("This is one of the most important patent issues to come
before the court in many years." Quoting Donald Dunner, a name partner at Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner in Washington, D.C.).
205. Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1334-1335 (Mayer, J., dissenting)
206. Mark W. Fischer, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/01/phillipsv awh_.html, (last visited Feb. 11, 2006).
Unfortunately, on February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. AWH Corp. v. Phillips,
2006 U.S. LEXIS 1154 (2006).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Akron School of Law, M.S., Mechanical Engineering,
2006, University of Illinois, B.S., summa cum laude, Mechanical Engineering, 2004, Case Western
Reserve University. I would like to express my endless gratitude to my wife, Latricia A. Jethrow,
for her continued love and support throughout our marriage. I would also like to thank my parents,
Clarence and Patricia Jethrow, for their constant encouragement and support throughout my life. I
would also like to acknowledge and thank Michael Centanni, Mark Kusner and Michael Jaffe for
their constant encouragement and assistance with this article. Finally, I would like to dedicate this
article to the law students and professors at The University of Akron School of Law, who have
become my friends and mentors.
40
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol1/iss1/4
